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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under section 307(b) of the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012), to review the final 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action issuing a 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit to Sylvanergy, 
L.L.C. This Court also has jurisdiction to review all intermediate 
and interlocutory decisions relevant to EPA's final action. 5 
U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (providing that an "intermediate agency 
action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the 
review of the final agency action"). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court has jurisdiction to review final Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits, as well as intermediate 
decisions made during the PSD permitting process.  Sylvanergy, 
L.L.C. (Sylvanergy) timely petitioned this court for review of the 
PSD permit issued by New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB). 
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review NUARB's 
interlocutory decision to deny Sylvanergy's request for a Non-
Applicability Determination? 
 
Sylvanergy proposed a biomass-fired electricity generation 
facility that contains only two 60 MMBtu/hour fossil fuel start-up 
burners. Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), a fossil fuel-fired steam 
electric plant is regulated under the PSD program if it has a heat 
input of more than 250 MMBtu/hour. Did NUARB err in 
classifying the Sylvanergy facility as a fossil fuel-fired plant? 
 
Because Sylvanergy's proposed facility is not one of the 28 
specified sources under CAA section 165, it is only subject to PSD 
review if it emits more than 250 tons per year(tpy) of carbon 
monoxide (CO). Locally imposed, binding output restrictions 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
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prevent the proposed facility from emitting any more than 190 
tpy of CO. Did NUARB err in determining that the proposed 
facility's CO emissions triggered PSD review? 
 
An EPA rule deferring regulation of biogenic carbon dioxide 
emissions was in effect at the time NUARB issued Sylvanergy's 
PSD permit. EPA has consistently recognized that biomass-fired 
electricity generation can be carbon neutral. Did NUARB err in 
subjecting Sylvanergy's proposed facility to PSD review for 
greenhouse gas emissions? 
 
In step one of a best available control technology (BACT) 
determination, the permit issuer does not consider those control 
technologies that would impermissibly redefine the permit 
applicant's proposed source. NUARB determined that requiring 
Sylvanergy to gasify wood and burn gas, rather than burn wood, 
would redefine the proposed facility. Was NUARB's 
determination reasonable? 
 
Although BACT traditionally involves onsite control 
technologies, NUARB ultimately determined that BACT for 
Sylvanergy's proposed facility involvespurchasing and managing 
25,000 hectares of forested land on a separate piece of property. 
Did NUARB err by considering "beyond-the-fence" measures in 
its BACT determination? 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition to review the grant of a Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit to Sylvanergy, L.L.C. 
(Sylvanergy). R. 4. Sylvanergy seeks to construct a new biomass-
fired electricity generation and wood pellet production facility in 
Forestdale, New Union. R. 5. New Union Air Resources Board 
(NUARB) found that two start-up burners using fossil fuels 
rendered Sylvanergy's proposed biomass-fired facility a "fossil-
fuel facility" subject to a lower threshold for emissions. R. 6. 
3
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Further, NUARBdetermined it would be impermissible to 
consider local operational controls in assessing the facility's 
potential to emit pollutants. Id. Therefore, NUARB denied 
Sylvanergy's request for a Non-Applicability Determination 
(NAD) and found that Sylvanergy's facility is a "major emitting 
facility" subject to PSD review. Id.During its PSD review, 
NUARB adopted a Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Sylvanergy's proposed 
facility. Id. 
Petitions for review of the NUARB decisions were timely filed 
with the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) by both Sylvanergy 
and Save Our Climate, Inc. (SOC), an environmental non-profit 
corporation. R. 4. Sylvanergy sought review of the NAD denial, 
the applicability of PSD review for biomass facilities, and the 
imposition of the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for GHG 
emissions. R. 7. SOC challenged the denial of a wood gasification 
and partial carbon capture and storage as BACT. Id. The EAB 
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the NAD denial, as it 
held that action did not constitute a "PSD final permit decision." 
R. 8. The EAB further determined that use of biofuels alone does 
not constitute BACT, R. 11; that NUARB properly excluded wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage from its 
BACT analysis, R. 13; and that NUARB reasonably imposed the 
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. R. 12.Sylvanergy timely filed 
this petition for review of the EAB decision. R. 1. 
 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sylvanergy, L.L.C. (Sylvanergy) proposed to build the 
Forestdale Biomass Facility—a biomass-fired electricity 
generation facility—approximately 2 km from the center of 
Forestdale, New Union. R. 5. Sylvanergy designed the Forestdale 
Biomass Facility to include a biomass-fired electricity generation 
unit with a capacity of 40 megawatts, as well as a wood pellet fuel 
production plant. Id. The planned 500 million British thermal 
units per hour (MMBtu/hour) electricity generation unit would 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
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primarily use a wood-fired boiler, and two ultra-low sulfur diesel 
start-up burners would be used to start the boiler. Id. 
The designed facility initially had a potential to emit 350,000 
tons per year (tpy) of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at full capacity, 
and 255 tpy of carbon monoxide (CO) at 96% operational capacity. 
Id. However, when Village of Forestdale granted site approval for 
the proposed facility, it conditioned its approval upon the facility 
operating at 75% capacity, or 6,500 hours annually. Id. This 
operational restriction mitigates the impact of log trucks 
transporting lumber through Forestdale for processing at 
Sylvanergy's proposed facility. Id. The Village of Forestdale 
incorporated the operational restriction into the site plan, and it 
is enforceable by the Forestdale Building Inspector. Id. Based on 
these restricted operating conditions, the facility has the 
potential to emit no more than 190 tpy of CO, as well as lesser 
amounts of other criteria pollutants. Id.Despite the enforceable 
emissions limitation, New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB) 
determined that Sylvanergy requires a Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) permit in order to operate the Forestdale 
Biomass Facility. R. 6. Further, NUARB decided to conduct PSD 
review for GHG emissions over Sylvanergy's objection. Id. 
After determining that PSD review applied to GHG 
emissions, NUARB conducted a top-down approach to determine 
what should be implemented as Best Available Control 
Technology (BACT) for GHG emissions. Id. NUARB considered 
carbon capture and storage, but determined that this technology 
is not currently available for biomass combustion. Id. NUARB 
next considered alternative fuels like natural gas, as well as wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage. R. 7. Both 
options were rejected as impermissible redefinitions of the source. 
Id. Finally, NUARB considered a Sustainable Forest Plan that 
involves management of a separate 25,000 hectare reforestation 
area. Id. NUARB ultimately adopted the Sustainable Forest Plan 
as BACT, requiring Sylvanergy to purchase 25,000 hectares of 
land outside of the Forestdale Biomass Facility property, at an 
estimated cost of $10 million. R. 7. 
 
 
5
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Administrator's decision must be vacated if it is 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law." Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2012); see alsoAlaska Dept. of Envtl. 
Conservation v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004) 
(indicating APA standard of review applies to review of 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit where Clean Air 
Act sections do not specify the review standard). 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sylvanergy, L.L.C. (Sylvanergy) timely petitioned this Court 
to review a final Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
permit issued by New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB).  
Upon review of that final agency action, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review all intermediate decisions leading to the 
PSD permit, including NUARB's threshold decision that PSD 
review applies to the Forestdale Biomass Facility. Therefore, this 
Court should grant review of NUARB's Non-Applicability 
Determination (NAD) and find that NUARB impermissibly 
subjected Sylvanergy's proposed facility to PSD review. 
NUARB erred by concluding thatthe Forestdale Biomass 
Facility is a "major emitting facility" subject to PSD regulation. 
Sylvanergy's proposed facility is not a listed source subject to the 
100 ton per year (tpy) emissions threshold because it is not fossil 
fuel-fired. Further, the facility does not have the potential to emit 
more than 250 tpy of any relevant pollutant because the Village 
of Forestdale imposed practical and enforceable operational 
controls that lower the facility's emissions potential below the 
statutory threshold. Thus, this Court should remand to NUARB 
to reconsider Sylvanergy's NAD request in light of the locally 
imposed operational restrictions. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
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NUARB also erroneously subjected the Forestdale Biomass 
Facility to PSD review for greenhouse gases (GHGs). At the time 
NUARB issued Sylvanergy's PSD permit, it arbitrarily failed to 
consider an EPA regulation deferring PSD review of biogenic 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions until a later date. In addition, 
EPA has consistently acknowledged the potential of biomass-fired 
electricity generation to provide carbon-neutral renewable 
energy. As such, EPA has continuously asserted that it would like 
to defer regulation of biogenic CO2 emissions until it can be 
certain that there is a regulatory benefit. Subjecting Sylvanergy's 
proposed facility to PSD review for GHGs represented an 
irrational departure from EPA's consistent policy position. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate NUARB's decision to subject 
Sylvanergy's proposed facility to PSD review as arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Finally, NUARB erred in determining the best available 
control technology (BACT) for the Forestdale Biomass Facility. As 
a threshold matter, the agency reasonably found that wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage redefined the 
source, as it would substantially change the design of 
Sylvanergy's proposed facility. However, NUARB impermissibly 
considered "beyond-the-fence" measures in identifying the 
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT, as BACT traditionally involves 
onsite control technologies more readily understood as 
technological.Therefore, if this Court finds that the Forestdale 
Biomass Facility is subject to PSD review, it should nevertheless 
remand the PSD permit to NUARB for a proper BACT 
determination. 
 
 
 
 
7
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ARGUMENT 
I.  THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
THE NON-APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION 
BECAUSE THAT INTERLOCUTORY DECISION 
ONLY BECAME REVIEWABLE AFTER 
SYLVANERGY EXHAUSTED ALL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB) denied 
Sylvanergy's request for a Non-Applicability Determination 
(NAD) as an intermediate step in the Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) permitting process. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review all subsidiary decisions related to issuance 
of the PSD permit now that Sylvanergy has exhausted its 
administrative remedies. Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) confers jurisdiction on the circuit courts of appeals to 
review several specific actions of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, in addition to "any other 
final action of the Administrator under this chapter . . . which is 
locally or regionally applicable." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012). 
Under section 307(b), parties must file petitions for review 
"within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, 
approval, or action appears in the Federal Register." Id. 
Here, the denial of Sylvanergy's NAD request—thereby 
subjecting the Forestdale Biomass Facility to PSD review—did 
not constitute a final agency action for which Sylvanergy had to 
seek judicial review within sixty days.1 Instead, the sixty day 
limitation period began after the Environmental Appeals Board 
(EAB) reached its final decision and the Regional Administrator 
published the PSD permit in the Federal Register, rendering the 
agency action "final" pursuant to EPA regulations. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 124.19(l)(2) (2014) (providing that a final action on a PSD 
permit does not occur until all administrative remedies are 
 
1
 A section 165 imposes best available control technology requirements on facilities 
subject to PSD review. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2012). 
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exhausted); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 773 F.2d 
375, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a sixty day limitations 
period did not begin to run until after an order was published in 
the Federal Register, rendering that order effective). Sylvanergy 
timely petitioned this Court for review of the EAB decision. R. 1. 
While reviewing that final agency action, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review all intermediate decisions reached before 
EPA published the final PSD permit. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 
(providing that courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory 
decisions upon review of a final agency action). 
A.  The denial of the NAD request was an 
intermediate step in the PSD permitting process, 
not a final agency action, and provided an 
insufficient basis for judicial review until an 
adequate factual record was developed during 
PSD permitting. 
The term "final action . . . bears the same meaning in § 
307(b)(1) that it does under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704." Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001). Thus, for an action to be reviewable 
under section 307(b) it must at least satisfy the following APA 
criteria for finality: "First, the action must mark the 
'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process—it must 
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, 
the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been 
determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow.'" 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (internal citations 
omitted). This does not mean that interlocutory actions such as 
NUARB's NAD decision are unreviewable; instead, "[a] 
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling 
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the 
final agency action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). Because the NAD 
decision was an aspect of the PSD permitting process, it became 
reviewable as part of that final agency action when the Regional 
Administrator published the final PSD permit in the Federal 
Register. 
Multiple circuits have recognized that agency deliberations 
are ongoing until the agency takes action on a permit application, 
9
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thus providing its final position as to what standards and controls 
should apply to a proposed facility. See Ocean Cty. Landfill Corp. 
v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 631 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that "a new permit, not intermediate decisions, will 
mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking 
process"); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
225 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
consummation of agency decision making "cannot occur before the 
[state agency] has acted on the permit application).  Threshold 
determinations merely indicating that further agency action is 
required—like deciding that PSD review should apply to a 
proposed facility—cannot be reviewed immediately. See Fed. 
Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 
241 (1980) (finding an agency determination that adjudicatory 
proceedings were merited did not represent a final agency 
decision, only a threshold opinion). 
In Ocean County Landfill, the Third Circuit considered a 
challenge to an EPA determination that two facilities were under 
"common control," which required reopening and reissuing the 
operating permits of each facility to reflect their status as a single 
source. 631 F.3d at 654. Although EPA characterized its decision 
as "final," the Third Circuit did not have jurisdiction to review the 
common control determination because it "was only one, 
intermediate, step in the permitting process." Id. at 655. The 
court also found it significant that EPA's decision did not require 
immediate compliance, but merely instructed a facility to begin 
the permitting process. Id.at 656. Thus, in Ocean County 
Landfill, determining that a certain permit was required did not 
represent the culmination of the agency's decision-making 
process, because drafting and commenting on a permit can expose 
new facts and allow the agency to change position. Id. at 655. 
Similarly, NUARB's rejection of Sylvanergy's NAD request 
was an interlocutory decision that only informed Sylvanergy of 
the agency's opinion that a particular permit would be required 
for a proposed facility. As the court made clear in Ocean County 
Landfill, requiring a party to begin permitting procedures does 
not represent a reviewable final agency action because the fact-
finding involved in drafting a permit and soliciting comments will  
provide a court with the information necessary to resolve all 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
  
2016] BEST BRIEF: SYLVANERGY 109 
 
disputes related to a facility in a single proceeding. Id. at 656 
(explaining that the court's "ability to decide the issue would 
benefit greatly from additional facts, most importantly the terms 
of a new permit and whether and/or how it will harm [the 
permitee]"). In addition, the denial of the NAD request merely 
alerted Sylvanergy of its preexisting obligations under the CAA, 
and did not impose any new legal obligations or penalties. As the 
Seventh Circuit has recognized, a decision is not reviewable as a 
final agency action when it "has no legal force except to impose 
upon [a party] the already-existing burden of complying with the 
CAA and its implementing regulations." Acker v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 290 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, because the 
NAD decision did not represent the consummation of the agency's 
permitting process and did not impose any new penalties, this 
Court now has jurisdiction to review that decision as an 
intermediate part of the PSD permitting process. 
Although the EAB decision cites Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989),for the 
proposition that the denial of an NAD request is subject to 
immediate review in the courts of appeals, R. 8, that case is 
inapposite. In Puerto Rican Cement, the First Circuit recognized 
that the denial of an NAD was analogous to a decision of the 
Federal Trade Commission to initiate costly proceedings against 
a company, which the Supreme Court held not to be a final 
agency action. 889 F.2d at 295 (citing Fed. Trade Comm'n v. 
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)). However, in finding 
that it had jurisdiction, the First Circuit decided to "apply the 
exception and not the rule," in light of the fact that EPA did not 
contest jurisdiction, and thus waived all exhaustion 
requirements. Id. at 295–96. Here, unlike in Puerto Rican 
Cement, EPA did not consent to interlocutory judicial review after 
the NAD decision. Therefore this Court should apply the rule and 
not the exception by reviewing NUARB's NAD denial as a 
component of the final PSD permit. 
B.  No PSD decisions are reviewable under section 
307(b) until all administrative remedies are 
exhausted, and thus even if the NAD decision 
otherwise satisfies the test for a "final agency 
11
  
110 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 7 
 
action," it is only now reviewable after the EAB 
issued its decision. 
In addition to satisfying the Supreme Court's test for finality, 
a party seeking judicial review of an agency action must meet the 
separate but related requirement of exhausting all administrative 
remedies. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 
50–51 (1938) (explaining that "no one is entitled to judicial relief 
for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed 
administrative remedy has been exhausted"). Although finality 
and exhaustion are similar jurisdictional prerequisites, the two 
concepts "are not identical . . . no matter how often they 
converge." Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 669 
F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1982). Finality generally refers to the 
conclusion of the agency's decision-making process, while 
exhaustion concerns the steps a litigant must take before seeking 
judicial review of an agency action. Id. 
EPA regulations provide that PSD permit decisions only 
become final actions once a permit applicant has exhausted all 
administrative remedies. 40 C.F.R.§ 124.19(l)(2) (2014) ("For 
purposes of judicial review under the appropriate Act, final 
agency action on a . . . PSD permit occurs when agency review 
procedures under this section are exhausted and the Regional 
Administrator subsequently issues a final permit decision under 
this paragraph."). Further, the CAA regulations indicate that 
reviewable PSD permit decisions include both specific permit 
conditions, as well as the threshold decision to issue a permit. See 
id. § 124.13 (describing the issues petitioners must raise during 
commenting in order to later seek EAB review, including 
challenges to "any condition of a draft permit" and the decision to 
"prepare a draft permit"). Therefore, so long as a permittee 
expresses disagreement with the denial of an NAD during public 
commenting, that issue can later be raised on appeal to the EAB. 
See id. § 124.19(a)(4)(ii) (providing that the EAB has jurisdiction 
to review issues raised by petitioners during a public comment 
period to the extent required by 40 C.F.R § 124.13, which 
contemplates review of the decision that a facility needs a PSD 
permit). Here, NUARB's denial of Sylvanergy's NAD request was 
reviewable on appeal to the EAB as part of the PSD permitting 
process, and only became a final agency action for the purposes of 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
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section 307(b) review once the EAB issued its decision and the 
Regional Administrator published the final PSD permit. Id. § 
124.19(l)(2) (providing that agency actions are not final until a 
party exhausts administrative remedies by seeking EAB review). 
Now that the agency action is final under the terms of the CAA 
and all administrative remedies have been exhausted, this Court 
has jurisdiction to review all intermediate and subsidiary 
decisions involved in issuing the PSD permit, including the 
threshold decision that a PSD permit is necessary for the 
Forestdale Biomass Facility. 
II.  THE FORESTDALE BIOMASS FACILITY IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE 100 TPY THRESHOLD 
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MEET EPA'S 
DEFINITION OF A FOSSIL FUEL-FIRED 
FACILITY. 
Sylvanergy's proposed facility is subject to the 100 tpy 
threshold for PSD review only if it qualifies as one of 28 
enumerated sources, including either a "fossil-fuel fired steam 
electric plant" or a "fossil-fuel boiler." See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) 
(2012) (defining 'major emitting facility' for PSD regulation). The 
CAA imposes PSD requirements on fossil fuel facilities that have 
a heat input of greater than 250 million British thermal units per 
hour (MMBtu/hour). Id.NUARB erred in characterizing the 
Forestdale Biomass Facility as a fossil fuel source subject to the 
100 tpy threshold for two reasons. First, Sylvanergy's plant 
design involves a biomass-fired electricity generation unit, not a 
fossil fuel-fired source. R. 5. Second, even if classified as a fossil-
fuel source, the Forestdale Biomass Facility nonetheless fails to 
meet the heat input criteria of the CAA because its two ultra-low 
sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up burners do not have the capacity to 
generate more than 120 MMBtu/hour.2Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) 
(listing heat input criteria for fossil fuel sources). Thereforethis 
Court should reverse NUARB's findingthat the Forestdale 
Biomass Facility is fossil-fuel source. 
 
 2. The Forestdale Biomass Facility uses two 60 MMBtu/hour ULSD start-up 
burners. R. 5. The two burners function as part of the same electricity 
generation unit, and are counted together for purposes of determining heat 
input. 
13
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A.  The Forestdale Biomass Facility is a biomass 
source, not a fossil fuel source. 
Biomass is not considered a fossil fuel for PSD purposes. See 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP 
MANUAL: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND 
NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING A-22 to A-23 (Draft, 1990) 
[hereinafter "NSR MANUAL"]. EPA distinguishes between fossil 
fuel fired steam electric plants and biomass facilities, finding that 
if  a "boiler were designed and permitted to burn wood only, it 
would not be classified as one of the 28 PSD sources and would 
instead be subject to the 250 tpy threshold." Id. 
Here, the Forestdale Biomass Facility combines a wood pellet 
production plant with a wood-fired boiler capable of generating 
steam-based electricity by combusting biomass. R. 5. NUARB 
considered the plant "fossil-fuel fired" because the design utilizes 
ULSD ignition sources to start the biomass boiler. Id.; R. 6. 
However, the use of some fossil fuels does not render the facility a 
fossil fuel plant. The purpose of Sylvanergy's proposed facility is 
electricity generation, which is done by processing wood into 
pellets, combusting the wood pellets into steam and using steam 
to power a generator. R. 5. Fossil fuels comprise a single function 
in the chain, starting the boiler used for biomass combustion. 
This single function is not sufficient to classify the entire 
plant as a fossil fuel source because courts look to a facility's 
primary activity to discern the source designation. LaFleur v. 
Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 275 (2d Cir. 2002); see also NSR MANUAL 
at A-2 (describing the 'primary activity' test). In LaFleur, the 
court upheld a determination that a new source designed to both 
produce chemicals and process municipal waste was not subject 
to the 100 tpy threshold as a "chemical processing plant." 
LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 256. Although chemical production was a 
part of the process, the Second Circuit upheld EPA's 
determination that the plant was primarily a municipal waste 
facility because that part of the facility's operations generated the 
majority of its revenue and influenced the design and location of 
the plant. Id. at 276. 
A similar analysis applies to the Forestdale Biomass Facility. 
The facility's business model and design is centered around 
biomass, as evidenced by its wood pellet production plant, as well 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/4
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as its location in the aptly-named Forestdale, a well-forested 
region. R.7, 11. Analogous to the LaFleur court's comparison of 
revenue, here the Court can look at the input levels for each type 
of fuel to determine the nature of Sylvanergy's proposed facility. 
The biomass combustion has a heat input of 380 MMBtu/hour 
while the ULSD start-up burners comprise only 120 
MMBtu/hour, less than one quarter of the facility's total input. R. 
5. Such a small component part falls well short of constituting the 
primary activity of the proposed facility. Indeed, NUARB found 
that Sylvanergy's "primary reliance" would be on wood biomass 
and not fossil fuels. R. 6.Therefore, the NUARB erred in 
concluding that the Forestdale Biomass Facility is a fossil fuel-
fired source. 
B.  The Forestdale Biomass Facility's fossil fuel heat 
input is not sufficient to qualify as one of the listed 
sources subject to the 100 tpy threshold. 
Under the CAA, a fossil fuel source is only subject to the PSD 
program if it has a heat input of more than 250 MMBtu/hour. 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(a)(1). The Forestdale Biomass Facility's two ULSD 
start-up burners do not have the capacity to generate more than 
120 MMBtu/hour. R. 5. Thus, NUARB erred in determining that 
the proposed facility is subject to the PSD program as a fossil fuel 
source. 
Save Our Climate, Inc. (SOC) contends that the 76% of heat 
generated by biomass should be considered in determining if the 
facility is an eligible fossil fuel source. Even EPA acknowledges 
that this represents an improper reading of the statute, as 
evidenced by EPA's litigation position in this action. See R. 2. In 
prior instances, EPA has noted that where a facility produces 
electricity through both biomass and fossil fuels, only the heat 
input of the fossil fuels is used to determine if the source meets 
the statutory threshold. See In re Air Quality Permit No. 3434, 
N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., No. 07-04(A), 5 (2007).3 Further, of 
 
 3. Available at 
https://www.env.nm.gov/aqb/permit/documents/NSR_3434_Order_and_ 
Statement_of_Reasons_for_Granting_Permit.pdf (overturning a permit denial 
for biomass plant with fossil-fuel start-up burners in part on EPA’s 
interpretation that source would not be subject to 100 tpy threshold). 
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all the enumerated PSD sources, only fossil fuel sources have a 
heat input specification. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). This suggests that 
Congress was not concerned with heat input generally, but with 
fossil fuel-derived heat input specifically. Therefore, it would 
make sense to calculate the fossil-fuel heat input specifically 
rather than the facility-wide heat input in defining the source. 
Because Congress only specified a heat input threshold for fossil 
fuels, it is untenable to interpret the statute as requiring 
measurement of facility-wide heat input. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the finding of NUARB that the Forestdale 
Biomass Facility is a fossil fuel source subject to the 100 tpy 
threshold. 
III.  THE FORESTDALE BIOMASS FACILITY DOES 
NOT HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO EMIT MORE 
THAN 250 TPY OF ANY RELEVANT POLLUTANT 
BECAUSE LOCALLY IMPOSED AND 
ENFORCEABLE RESTRICTIONS LOWER THE 
FACILITY'S EMISSIONS BELOW THE 
THRESHOLD. 
Sources that are not specifically listed under section 169(1) 
are only subject to PSD review if the source has the potential to 
emit greater than 250 tpy of a relevant pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 
7479(1). "Potential to emit" is not defined by statute. Id. Courts 
have stated that EPA must take emission controls into account 
when calculating potential to emit. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 
636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Forestdale Biomass 
Facility's potential to emit does not exceed the 250 tpy threshold 
because it is subject to locally imposed emission controls. R. 5. 
NUARB erred in applying vacated regulations and an 
inapplicable Interim Policy to reject the properly calculated 
potential to emit, which includes the locally enforced operating 
conditions. This Court should reverse NUARB's decision finding 
that the Forestdale Biomass Facility is a "major emitting facility." 
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A.  NUARB erred in applying EPA's "federally 
enforceable" regulatory requirement, which is no 
longer good law. 
In refusing to consider locally-enforced controls that restrict 
the operational capacity of the Forestdale Biomass Facility, 
NUARB relied on an EPA regulation that requires controls to be 
"federally enforceable." R. 6; 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) (2014). 
However, this regulation is no longer valid in the wake of two 
D.C. Circuit decisions invalidating the regulations.4See Nat'l 
Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency., 59 F.3d 1351, 1364 
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 70 
F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In National Mining, the court clarified 
that potential to emit, in the section 112 program regulations, 
cannot be reasonably read to include only federally enforced 
controls.59 F.3d at 1364. The court noted that potential to emit 
plainly refers to non-voluntary, effective, and practical controls, 
but rejected EPA's "rather strained interpretation of the statute." 
Id. In Chemical Manufacturer's, the court addressed the same 
"federally enforceable" language, this time under the New Source 
Review regulations. 70 F.3d at 637. The court vacated the rule in 
light of the "similar challenge" that was addressed in National 
Mining.5Id. EPA did not appeal the rulings. NUARB 
impermissibly relied on these regulations in refusing to count the 
Forestdale Biomass Facility's locally enforceable controls when 
calculating its potential to emit. 
B.  EPA's Interim Policy is not applicable to 
Sylvanergy or entitled to deference. 
In light of these decisions, EPA issued an Interim Policy 
memo in January 1996 to address federal enforceability 
requirements. Memorandum from John S. Sietz, Director, Office 
 
 4. As nationally applicable, these regulations may only be challenged in the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Decisions are given 
nation-wide effect. See, e.g. U.S. v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1357 
(5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing holding of National Mining). 
 5. Although EPA has declined to remove the vacated regulations from the 
CFR, they have no legal effect. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 70 F.3d at 637; Action on 
Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(defining “vacate”). 
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of Air Quality Planning and Standards, and Robert I Van 
Heuvelen, Director, Office of Regulatory Enforcement to Regional 
Offices, 5 (Jan. 22, 1996) [hereinafter "Interim Policy"]. The 
Interim Policy stated that in the PSD context "the term 'federally 
enforceable' should now be read to mean 'federally enforceable or 
legally and practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution 
control agency.'" Id. However, this position is inconsistent with 
the ruling in Chemical Manufacturer's and the Interim Policy has 
no legal application to Sylvanergy's NAD. 
Although EPA interprets the D.C. Circuit's decision as 
vacating "the PSD/NSR federal enforceability requirement," this 
misstates the court's holding. Interim Policy at 4. The petitioners 
challenged "regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency 
that define the term'potential to emit'" and the Court held that 
"the regulations are vacated." Chem. Mfrs., 70 F.3d at 637 
(emphasis added).Thus, the regulatory definition of "potential to 
emit," and not merely the "federally enforceable" requirement 
was vacated. EPA has declined to promulgate a new definition of 
"potential to emit" for the past nineteen years. As such, only the 
statutory text is binding for PSD determinations. The term 
"federally enforceable" does not appear in the statute, it appears 
only in the now-vacated regulations. Chem. Mfrs., 70 F.3d at 637; 
42 U.S.C. § 7479 (defining 'major source').  The Interim Policy 
does not purport to interpret "potential to emit," which is the 
governing term for review of Sylvanergy's NAD request. 
Because EPA is interpreting neither the statute nor a valid 
regulation, and the Interim Policy was not promulgated under 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is entitled to Skidmore 
deference at best. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944). Non-legislative agency pronouncements are "entitled to 
respect" under Skidmore to the extent they have the "power to 
persuade." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006), quoting 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Factors indicating the weight given to 
such interpretations include the "thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
140. The Interim Policy was intended to be a temporary policy, 
until supplanted by regulations that would give full consideration 
to the appropriate statutory requirements. Interim Policy at 2–3. 
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The agency gave no explanation for the requirement that a state 
or local air pollution control agency enforce any emissions 
limitations. Id. at 3. Further, requiring enforcement by an air 
pollution control agency has no basis in either the statutory 
language or the D.C. Circuit opinion rejecting the regulation. See 
Nat'l Mining, 59 F.3d at 1362. Finally, as the D.C. Circuit noted, 
the agency's position on requiring federally enforceable controls 
has varied widely. Id. EPA's Interim Policy is therefore 
unpersuasive and should be rejected under Skidmore. 
C.  NUARB's assessmentof the Forestdale Biomass 
Facility'spotential to emit was arbitrary and 
capricious because it failed to consider locally-
imposed operational restrictions. 
NUARB erred in failing to consider the Village of 
Forestdale's operational restrictions in assessing the Forestdale 
Biomass Facility'spotential to emit criteria pollutants. National 
Mining—cited as the rationale for vacatur of the "potential to 
emit" regulations in the PSD context—provides guidance for 
assessing the adequacy of controls limiting a source's potential to 
emit. 59 F.3d at 1362. There, the D.C. Circuit established that 
under the plain meaning of "potential to emit," emissions controls 
must only be effective and non-voluntary. Id. According to this 
reasoning, the Forestdale Biomass Facility'scalculated potential 
to emit must include the operational limits that are documented 
in the site approval plan and enforceable by regulatory personnel. 
R. 5. Operational limits are a well-established means of 
controlling emissions, which EPA has often cited as exemplary 
means to limit emissions. See, e.g., Requirements for Preparation, 
Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and 
Promulgation of Implementation Plans 48 Fed. Reg. 38,742, 
38,747 (proposed Aug. 25, 1983) (citing limit on hours as example 
of emission limit); NSR MANUAL at A-1 (listing restrictions on 
hours of operations as condition which limits potential to emit). 
Because the Village of Forestdale's operational restrictions satisfy 
the D.C. Circuit's criteria for an effective emissions limitation, 
NUARB erroneously concluded that the Forestdale Biomass 
Facilityhas the potential to emit more than 250 tpy of CO. 
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Accordingly, this Court should reverse the denial of Sylvanergy's 
NAD request. 
IV.  BIOMASS-FUELED FACILITIES ARE NOT 
SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW FOR GHG 
EMISSIONS, BECAUSE SUCH FACILITIES ARE 
CARBON NEUTRAL AND EPA HAS 
CONSISTENTLY RECOGNIZED A PSD 
EXEMPTION FOR BIOGENIC CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS. 
 
EPA has consistently recognized that biogenic carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions do not pose the same risks to the planet as 
emissions from fossil fuel-fired facilities, and the agency should 
continue its practice of exempting biomass facilities from PSD 
review for CO2 because such facilities are carbon neutral. See, 
e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 34,830, 34,843–44 n.30 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (describing biomass as a form of 
"renewable energy" akin to wind or solar energy).After the 
Supreme Court determined that greenhouse gases (GHGs) qualify 
as a "pollutant" under the CAA, Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007), EPA made a finding that 
GHGs in the atmosphere endanger public health and welfare, 
leading to regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles. 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 
66,496, 66,497 (December 15, 2009). Shortly after the 
endangerment finding, EPA promulgated a "Tailoring Rule" that 
specified the thresholds at which new facilities would be subject 
to PSD review for GHGs, indicating that PSD regulation of GHGs 
would begin in January, 2011. See Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31,514, 31,523 (June 3, 2010). 
However, EPA immediately recognized that GHG emissions 
from biomass facilities cannot be treated in the same manner as 
GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired plants, and one month after 
promulgating the Tailoring Rule, EPA issued a Call for 
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Information regarding the best means of accounting for biogenic 
GHG emissions. See 75 Fed. Reg. 41,173 (July 15, 2010). In 
response to comments received during the Call for Information 
and a separate petition stressing that the combustion of biomass 
does not raise net atmospheric levels of GHGs, EPA decided to 
defer regulation of GHGs under the PSD program until July 20, 
2014, so it could take more time to study the issue. Deferral for 
CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under 
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V 
Programs (Deferral Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011). 
The Deferral Rule recognizes the marginal benefit of regulating 
biogenic GHG emissions and acknowledges that biomass facilities 
are potentially carbon neutral. Id. at 43,492. 
During the deferral period, EPA developed a framework for 
analyzing biogenic GHG emissions. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING BIOGENIC CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
STATIONARY SOURCES (2011). Although this framework indicates 
that carbon neutrality cannot be assumed in all cases, it also 
states that "biogenic CO2 emissions from stationary sources will 
not inevitably result in an increased net flux of biogenic CO2 to 
the atmosphere within a policy-relevant time scale- unlike CO2 
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels." Id. at 3, 6. This is 
because biomass fuels are able to sequester carbon from the 
Earth's atmosphere over a short period of time, and the biogenic 
CO2 emissions resulting from combustion are a part of the 
natural carbon cycle. Id. at 1. The logic of EPA's framework—
which explains how regulators can determine whether a biomass 
facility might have a net impact on atmospheric CO2 levels—
indicates that a facility should not automatically be subject to 
PSD review for biogenic CO2 emissions. Id. Instead, a biomass 
facility should only be subject to technology-based requirements if 
EPA determines that it will increase net atmospheric levels of 
GHGs. Id. In addition, EPA recognizes that the use of biomass is 
a potential means of reducing net GHG emissions. See 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 34,923 (listing the use of biomass fuel as a "potential 
emission reduction measure"). 
Even if EPA eventually determines that biogenic GHG 
emissions are not categorically exempt from PSD review, NUARB 
impermissibly subjected the Forestdale Biomass Facility to PSD 
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review for GHGs. At the time the permit was issued the Deferral 
Rule was still legally in effect and imposing PSD requirements on 
the GHG emissions at a biomass facility represented an irrational 
departure from past agency practice. Therefore, NUARB's 
decision to subject the Forestdale Biomass Facilityto PSD review 
for CO2 should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. 
A.  The Deferral Rule was legally in effect when 
NUARB issued the permit, and agencies are 
required to apply whatever law is controlling at 
the time a permit is issued. 
 
The EAB cites Center for Biological Diversity(CBD) v. 
EPA,722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013), for the proposition that the 
D.C. Circuit invalidated the Deferral Rule before Sylvanergy's 
PSD permit was issued. R. 8. However, though the D.C. Circuit 
asserted that EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to regulate all 
emissions of GHGs under the PSD program and determined that 
the Deferral Rule should be invalidated, 722 F.3d at 412, the 
court never issued a mandate officially vacating the rule. See In 
re Sierra Pac. Indus. (Anderson Processing Facility), PSD Appeal 
Nos. 13-01 to 13-04, 2013 WL 3791510, at *42 (EAB 2013) 
(indicating that "[t]he Court's judgment [vacating the Deferral 
Rule] will not become final and effective until such time as it 
issues a 'mandate'"). Because the Deferral Rule was never 
officially vacated and did not expire on its own terms until July 
20, 2014, that rule was still legally in effect when Sylvanergy's 
PSD permit was issued on June 12, 2014. R. 4. Further, EPA 
itself acknowledged that the Deferral Rule remained valid for the 
entire three year deferral period, indicating that the agency 
considered the rule to be in effect at the time Sylvanergy's permit 
was issued. Memorandum from Janet McCabe, EPA Office of Air 
and Radiation, to Regional Administrators, Next Steps and 
Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean Air Act Permitting 
Programs to Greenhouse Gases, at 6 (July 24, 2014). EPA must 
apply whatever law is controlling at the time a permit is issued, 
and it was therefore required to give effect to the Deferral Rule 
and exempt the Forestdale Biomass Facility from PSD review for 
GHGs. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 762 F.3d 971, 
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980 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that "EPA is bound to enforce 
administrative guidelines in effect when it takes final action"). 
In addition, the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency(UARG), 
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), undermines the reasoning of the CBD 
opinion. The CBD court did not address "whether the agency has 
authority under the Clean Air Act to permanently exempt 
biogenic carbon dioxide sources from the PSD permitting 
program." 722 F.3d at 412. Rather, the court assumed that EPA 
had a nondiscretionary duty to regulate biogenic GHG emissions 
under the CAA, and held that the Deferral Rule did not articulate 
a reasonable basis for avoiding a statutory mandate. Id. at 408–
09, 412. In UARG,the Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
EPA was compelled to regulate GHGs under the PSD program, 
and indicated that the agency could plausibly interpret the 
phrase "any air pollutant" in the PSD context to "exclude those 
atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in 
such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically 
transform those programs and render them unworkable as 
written." 134 S.Ct. at 2442. Thus, the Supreme Court found the 
CAA ambiguous with regard to PSD review of GHG emissions, a 
conclusion that permits EPA to permanently exempt biogenic 
GHG emissions from PSD review if it so chooses, and certainly 
allows the agency to defer regulation in light of scientific 
uncertainty as to whether biomass facilities have any net effect 
on atmospheric levels of GHGs. Because the agency chose to defer 
regulation of biogenic CO2 emissions until after July 20, 2014, it 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in subjecting the Forestdale 
Biomass Facilityto PSD review for CO2 emissions in the permit 
issued on June 12, 2014. 
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B.  Even if the D.C. Circuit had invalidated the 
Deferral Rule, subjecting Sylvanergy to PSD 
review for biogenic GHG emissions was arbitrary 
and capricious because such action represented an 
irrational departure from EPA's stated policy 
position. 
 
Even if the D.C. Circuit had issued a mandate vacating the 
deferral rule, EPA's decision to require PSD review of GHGs at 
the Forestdale Biomass Facilityrepresented an irrational 
departure from the agency's stated policy position and must be 
set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court has 
stated: 
Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it 
announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of 
adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of discretion 
will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as 
opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that 
must be overturned as "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion." 
Immigration &Naturalization Serv. v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 
26, 32 (1996). Thus, if an agency announces and follows a certain 
discretionary practice, it must act in accordance with that stated 
practice unless it provides a reasoned explanation for changing 
course. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983). 
In State Farm, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration rescinded a regulation requiring manufacturers 
to construct new cars with either passive seatbelts or airbags. Id. 
at 35–37. The agency stated that it no longer thought the 
regulation would provide significant safety benefits, though 
nearly all of the agency's reasoning was based on the inefficacy of 
the passive belts. Id. at 38–39. The Court held that the agency is 
permitted change position as to what actions are in the public 
interest, but that it acted arbitrarily in rescinding a rule 
purported to address important safety issues without a reasoned 
explanation as to why it no longer thought the rule would 
accomplish statutory objectives. Id. at 42–43. 
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Similarly, here EPA has failed to provide any explanation for 
its decision to apply PSD review to the GHG emissions at the 
Sylvanergy biomass facility, which conflicts with numerous 
agency statements indicating an intention to exempt biogenic 
GHG emissions from the PSD program until EPA can be certain 
that there would be a regulatory benefit to controlling such 
emissions. Apart from deferring PSD regulation of biogenic 
GHGs, EPA also released a guidance document to provide "a 
basis for concluding that under the PSD Program the combustion 
of biomass fuels can be considered BACT for biogenic CO2 
emissions at stationary sources." Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
43,492. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged the scientific 
uncertainty regarding the effect of biogenic CO2 emissions. See 
CBD, 722 F.3d at 407. In light of that uncertainty, EPA 
reasonably decided to conduct more research before subjecting 
biomass facilities to PSD review for GHG emissions, and 
acknowledges that there may be no benefit to regulation of 
certain biogenic GHGs. See, e.g., Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
43,492 ("EPA concluded that the issue of accounting for the net 
atmospheric impact of biogenic CO2 emissions is complex enough 
that further consideration of this important issue is warranted"); 
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 
34,924–25 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60) (explaining that "burning biomass-derived fuels for energy 
recovery can yield climate benefits as compared to burning 
conventional fossil fuels," and announcing that EPA needed to 
continue studying the impact of biogenic CO2 emissions in 
achieving emission reduction targets). Despite these clear 
statements of EPA policy, NUARB impermissibly imposed PSD 
requirements on the Forestdale Biomass Facility. Because that 
decision represents an unexplained departure from announced 
policy, it must be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. 
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V.  NUARB REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT 
WOOD GASIFICATION AND PARTIAL CARBON 
CAPTURE AND STORAGE WOULD 
IMPERMISSIBLY REDEFINE THE FORESTDALE 
BIOMASS FACILITY. 
Step one of the "top-down" method6for determining BACT 
requires identification of "all 'available' control options. Available 
control options are those air pollution control technologies or 
techniques . . . that have potential for practical application to the 
emissions unit and the regulated pollutant under evaluation." 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, 
GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING BEST AVAILABLE CONTROL 
TECHNOLOGY FOR REDUCING CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM 
BIOENERGY PRODUCTION 6, 24 (2011) [hereinafter "BACT 
GUIDANCE"].In step one of its BACT review, NUARB properly 
"rejected the implementation of wood gasification and partial 
carbon capture and storage as an impermissible redefinition of 
the proposed source." R. 7.  The agency's determination reflects 
an "important limitation on BACT"—it "cannot be used to order a 
fundamental redesign of [a] facility." UARG, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2448 
(2014); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 499 F.3d 
653, 654-655 (7th Cir. 2007). The CAA requires "the proposed 
facility [be] subject to the best available control technology." 42 
U.S.C. §7475(a)(4) (2012) (emphasis added). That is, BACT only 
applies only to the facility Sylvanergy intends to build.  If 
redesigns were considered control technologies, it "would stretch 
the term 'control technology' beyond the breaking point." Sierra 
Club, 499 F.3d at 655. 
The EAB has articulated how to determine what changes to a 
facility's design would constitute a redefinition of the proposed 
source. See, e.g.,In re Desert Rock Energy Company, LLC, 14 
E.A.D. 484, 530 (EAB 2009).First, the permit issuer evaluates 
how an applicant defines the facility's "end, object, aim or purpose 
. . . the facility's basic design." Id. Second, the permit issuer takes 
 
 6. The top-down framework is the recommended and “predominant method 
for determining BACT.”Clean Air Act Advisory Committee, Interim Phase I 
Report of the Climate Change Work Group of the Permits, New Source Review 
and Toxics Subcommittee16 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/caaac/climate/2010_02_InterimPhaseIReport.pdf. 
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a "hard look" at which design components are integral to the 
facility's purpose and which can be changed to reduce emissions 
"without disrupting the applicant's basic business purpose for the 
proposed facility." Id.7 In those instances when it is not readily 
apparent "where control technology ends and a redesign of the 
'proposed facility' begins," it is proper to defer to a reasonable 
agency decision. See Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 656 (If the 
distinction "is one of degree . . . the treatment of differences of 
degree  . . . is entrusted to the judgment of the agency that 
administers the regulatory scheme rather than to courts of 
generalist judges."). Here, NUARB reasonably determined that 
requiring Sylvanergy to gasify wood and burn gas, rather than 
burn wood, would fundamentally redefine the Forestdale Biomass 
Facility. 
Substantial change to a proposed design is a valid reason to 
find a control technology impermissibly redefines the proposed 
source. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Dep't of 
Envtl. Quality, 226 P.3d 809, 823 (Wyo. 2010). In Powder River 
Basin Resource Council, the applicant's proposed facility would 
include a "'subcritical' boiler," while petitioners argued for a 
"'supercritical' boiler," the difference being a matter of operating 
temperatures and pressures. Id. at 821. However, this distinction 
still required "a different boiler" with changes in its structure and 
components, and therefore would redefine the proposed source. 
Id. at 822. 
Here, the difference between control technologies is 
substantial, and NUARB reasonably found SOC's proposed option 
would redefine the design of the Forestdale Biomass Facility. 
Sylvanergy proposed to construct a wood pellet fuel production 
plant in conjunction with a biomass-fired electricity generation 
unit. R. 5. Within biomass-fired units, biomass such as wood 
pellets are solid fuel and "[are] burned in a boiler to produce high-
pressure steam that is used to power a steam turbine-driven 
power generator." U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY COMBINED HEAT 
 
 7. A permit issuer also evaluates whether the applicant has “intentionally 
design[ed] the plant in a way calculated to make measures for limiting the 
emission of pollutants ineffectual.” Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 654. However, no 
party argues that Sylvanergy proposed a design making potential emissions 
limitations ineffectual, and this factor will not be discussed. 
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AND POWER P'SHIP, BIOMASS COMBINED HEAT AND POWER 
CATALOG OF TECHNOLOGIES30 (2007) [hereinafter "CHP 
CATALOG"]. The Forestdale Biomass Facilityis designed to 
"consist of an advanced stoker design wood-fired boiler together 
with two ULSD start-up burners." R. 5. A stoker boiler "employ[s] 
direct fire combustion of solid fuels with excess air, producing hot 
flue gases, which then produce[s] steam." CHP CATALOGat 30. 
Sylvanergy's proposed design is far removed from the 
technology and processes involved in wood gasification. "Biomass 
gasification systems operate by heating biomass in an 
environment where the solid breaks down to form a flammable 
gas. The gas produced—synthetic gas, or syngas—can be cleaned, 
filtered, and then burned in a gas turbine." Id. at 26. Rather than 
the wood pellets acting as a solid fuel source in direct combustion, 
the wood pellets would undergo "several steps" in order for the 
actual fuel source, the syngas, to be obtained.  See Id.at 45. This 
requires technologies such as "fixed bed gasifiers and fluidized 
bed gasifiers," specific to the gasification process and beyond 
those proposed by Sylvanergy in the record. Id. at 30; see R. 5. 
The integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) "is not simply 
an add-on emissions control technology, but instead requires a 
differently designed power block." Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530.8 
Further, the fact that both control technologies use the same 
materials to generate the same product does not undermine the 
validity of NUARB's decision. SOC relies on Utah Chapter of 
Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board in arguing wood gasification and 
partial carbon capture and storage must be considered, as the 
"basic design" of the Forestdale Biomass Facility—an electric 
power generating plant fueled by wood—would remain 
unchanged. See 226 P.3d 719, 733 (Utah 2009) (agency erred in 
finding control technology redefined the source because it would 
not change the basic design of a proposed facility, an electric 
power generating plant fueled by coal). However, the Utah 
 
 8. SOC relies on Desert Rock in arguing NUARB improperly rejected wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage as BACT. See 14 E.A.D. at 
484 (finding agency inappropriately rejected consideration of IGCC as BACT). 
However, Desert Rock is distinguishable. The permit applicant in that case had 
included IGCC in its definition of the proposed facility; therefore, the agency had 
not taken the requisite “hard look”by ignoring this proposal and erred in its 
analysis. Id. at 547. 
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Chapter of Sierra Clubdecision should not be given significant 
weight here, as it is "too simplistic to say that a proposed source 
is defined solely by the raw materials it uses and the product it 
makes." Powder River Basin, 226 P.3d at 823. A control 
technology can redefine a source, even where the raw materials 
and end product are unchanged. See id. at 824; Sierra Club, 499 
at 654 (transport and changes in facility design led to rejection of 
control technology option, despite it using same raw materials to 
make same product). Similar to both Powder River Basin and 
Sierra Club, the control technology proposed by SOC would 
require substantial changes in design to the Forestdale Biomass 
Facility by requiring different equipment and more extensive 
processes. Therefore, at this stage in the BACT determination, it 
was reasonable for NUARB to conclude that wood gasification 
and partial carbon capture and storage would redefine the 
Forestdale Biomass Facility. 
VI. NUARB ERRED IN IMPOSING THE 
SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT 
BECAUSE IT IMPERMISSIBLY CONSIDERED 
"BEYOND-THE-FENCE" MEASURES CONTRARY 
TO CAA SECTION169(3). 
While NUARB reasonably found that wood gasification and 
partial carbon capture and storage redefined the source, it 
ultimately erred at step one of the BACT determination. The 
agency impermissibly considered "beyond-the-fence" measures in 
identifying the Sustainable Forest Plan as an available control 
option. Congress intended for BACT to be applied onsite, and the 
Supreme Court has cautioned against an unheralded expansion 
of the requirement in the GHG context. 
BACT is defined as: 
 
[A]n emissions limitation . . .which the permitting authority, on a 
case-by-case basis . . . determines is achievable for such facility 
through application of production processes and available 
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean 
fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for 
control of each such pollutant. 
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42 U.S.C. §7479(3) (2012). This definition does not indicate that a 
permit-issuing agency is allowed to consider offsite mitigation 
measures or offsets in its BACT determination. Even if this Court 
finds section 169(3) ambiguous on its face, an analysis of 
corresponding regulations, case law, and other CAA requirements 
show that considering "beyond-the-fence" measures is an 
impermissible construction of the statute. Because the Supreme 
Court has counseled against an expansive BACT requirement, 
this Court should find that NUARB operated outside the scope of 
the CAA section169(3) when it imposed the Sustainable Forest 
Plan. See UARG, 134 S.Ct. at 2447–49. 
A.  A permit-issuing agency is required to consider 
onsite, traditional control technology in its BACT 
determination. 
 
Fundamentally, the CAA instructs EPA to apply "best 
available controltechnology," 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (emphasis 
added), which suggests machinery, equipment, or some other sort 
of tangible object or process that physically limits emissions. See 
Control Technology, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY QUICK 
REFERENCE (Wolters Kluwer 2012) ("Devices, substances, and 
processes to control any activity."). An examination of BACT's 
definition supports this scope. Although "production processes 
and available methods, systems, and techniques" are undefined, 
Congress included a subsequent list of examples to illustrate 
what control technologies it considered permissible as BACT. See 
id.§ 7479(3)."We rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis—a word 
is known by the company it keeps—to 'avoid ascribing to [words] 
a meaning so broad that [they are] inconsistent with [their] 
accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts 
of Congress.'" Yates v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (internal 
citation omitted). Here, section 169(3) uses "fuel cleaning, clean 
fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques." 42 
U.S.C. §7479(3). These all refer to traditional technological 
processes that, logically and practically speaking, would occur 
onsite. While this list is not exclusive, it remains that NUARB's 
inclusion of offsite reforestation area management in the BACT 
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determination is an attempt to fit a square peg in a round hole. 
Indeed, in the preceding petition for review, the EAB 
acknowledges an absence of instances where offsite measures 
have been required as BACT. R. 11. Instead, cases apply the 
traditional, onsite BACT requirement. See, e.g., Alaska Dept. of 
Envtl. Conservation v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461 
(2004) (determining whether selective catalytic reduction or low-
NOxwould establish BACT standard for NOx from diesel electric 
generator); Sierra Club v. Wisconsin Dept. of Natural Res., 787 
N.W.2d 855 (Wis. App. 2010) (disputing whether BACT for SO2 
should be based on wet or dry flue gas desulfurization). This 
application of BACT is further supported by EPA guidance, which 
"interprets the language of the BACT definition . . . to include 
control methods that can be used facility-wide." BACT GUIDANCE 
at 23 (emphasis added). 
EPA's regulatory definition of BACT also indicates section 
169(3)'s scope. Beyond mirroring the statutory definition, the 
regulatory definition also provides: 
If the reviewing authority determines that technological or 
economic limitations on the application of measurement 
methodology to a particular emissions unit would make the 
imposition of an emissions standard infeasible, a design, 
equipment, work practice, operational standard or combination 
thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the requirement for 
the application of best available control technology. 
40 C.F.R. §51.166(b)(12) (2014). These prescriptions have been 
referred to as "non-numeric limitations" and are similar to the 
management plan NUARB determined as BACT.See, e.g., In re 
Indeck-Elwood, 13 E.A.D. 126, 176 (EAB 2006). As indicated by 
the regulations, however, non-numeric limitations are only 
available if EPA has considered and rejected technological 
limitations. See 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(12) (prescribing limitations 
only when traditional methods are "infeasible"). While these 
regulations do not go as far as suggesting offsite measures can be 
considered, they do indicate non-traditional measures should only 
be considered as a matter of last resort. Clearly, EPA's 
regulations supplement a narrow statutory scope, and the 
Sustainable Forest Plan falls outside what the CAA requires for 
BACT determinations. 
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Finally, any comparison to CAA section111(a)(1) in support of 
"beyond-the-fence" measures is misguided, as the corresponding 
"best system for emission reduction" (BSER) requirement is 
distinguishable from BACT. 42 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1). First, unlike 
BACT, which is limited in definition by references to traditional 
technological controls, BSER is undefined in the CAA and is open 
to broader, albeit reasonable agency interpretation.Second, 
legislative history also indicates broader considerations are 
permissible for BSER. Similar to BACT, section 111(a)(1) once 
referred to the "best technological system;" however, Congress 
removed this language in 1990. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104. Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401-7671q (2012)); H.R. 3316, 101st Cong., at 12-13 (1989) 
(proposing that emissions reductions be achieved through the use 
of not only technological systems but also emissions trading and 
other methods). More accurately, BSER and BACT are 
complementary, yet separate standards between New Source 
Performance Standards and PSD review—a relationship that 
Congress acknowledged during the 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments. See H.R. REP. 95-294, at 166 (1977), reprinted in 
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1245 (indicating that PSD policy, 
alongside BSER requirements under section 111, "will help 
strengthen incentives for new plants to use locally available coal 
plus best available control technology") (emphasis added). 
B.  The Supreme Court has cautioned against a 
regulatory expansion of BACT analysis. 
 
Even if this Court finds the CAA is ambiguous as to whether 
offsite measures can be considered in a BACT determination, 
recent concerns raised by the Supreme Court in UARG suggest 
this Court should refrain from allowing such novel and expansive 
regulatory authority. 134 S.Ct. 2427. Among the issues presented 
in UARG, the Supreme Court addressed whether EPA reasonably 
interpreted the CAA to require "anyway" sources to comply with 
BACT for GHGs. 134 S.Ct. at 2447. Petitioners argued that BACT 
fundamentally did not apply, as it "has traditionally been about 
end-of-stack controls 'such as catalytic converters or particle 
collectors'; but applying it to greenhouse gases will make it more 
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about regulating energy use . . . enabl[ing] regulators to control 
'every aspect of a facility's operation and design.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). While the Court concluded, in that context, there were 
proper regulatory restraints that mitigated concerns of 
"'unbounded' regulatory authority," it acknowledged 
the potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an 
unreasonable and unanticipated degree of regulation, and our 
decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of 
EPA's current approach, nor as a free rein for any future 
regulatory application of BACT in this distinct context. 
Id. at 2448–49. The same concerns for "unbounded regulatory 
authority" apply here. By considering offsite mitigation measures 
or offsets in determining BACT, NUARB acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Therefore, this Court must remand the PSD permit 
so NUARB can reevaluate its BACT determination. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Sylvanergy respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse New Union Air Resources 
Board's (NUARB's) denial of Sylvanergy's Non-Applicability 
Determination request. In the alternative, this Court should 
remand Sylvanergy's Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(PSD) permit to NUARB in recognition of the fact thatthe 
Forestdale Biomass Facilityshould not have been subjected to 
PSD review for biogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Finally, 
if this Court determines that NUARB can regulate biogenic CO2 
emissions under the PSD program, this Court should still remand 
the PSD permit and instruct NUARB to only consider onsite 
control technologies in its determination of best available control 
technology. 
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